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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Marjorie Allisen ("Allisen") argues in her response 
brief that even if this Court holds that the plain meaning of the 
Dram Shop Act in effect at the time of the accident bars her 
reliance upon that statute that she should be allowed to proceed 
on a common law negligence theory. This should not be allowed 
for two reasons: 
1. Allisen did not properly raise that issue in the trial 
court, and should not be allowed to do so at this timer and 
2. Utah does not recognize common law liability for dram 
shops. 
If Allisen is allowed to bring a common law negligence 
claim against the American Legion Post Number 134 the Legion 
must, in turn, be allowed to seek contribution from the third-
party defendants dismissed below. The arguments third-party 
defendants presented to justify their dismissal are inapplicable 
to a common law negligence theory. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MARJORIE ALLISEN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO 
PROCEED ON A COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE THEORY 
BECAUSE THAT ISSUE WAS NOT PROPERLY RAISED IN 
THE TRIAL COURT. 
A theory of recovery which was not submitted to the 
trial court ought not be considered on appeal. General Appliance 
Corporation v. Hawf Inc. , 516 P2d 346 (Utah 1973). In that case 
this Court held that the interest of orderly procedure precluded 
considerations of theories not raised at trial. Id, at 348. 
2 
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Similarly, in Simpson v. General Motors Corporation 470 P2d 399 
(Utah 1970), this Court ruled that a theory of liability which 
the plaintiff there attempted to inject on appeal for the first 
time would not be addressed. The reasoning again was that 
"[ojrderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final 
settlement of controversies, requires that a party must present 
his entire case and his theory or theories of recovery to the 
trial court; and having done so, he cannot thereafter change to 
some different theory and thus attempt to keep in motion a merry-
go-round of litigation." Id. at 401. See also, Yost v. State, 
640 P2d 1044 (dram shop action where a defense was disallowed on 
appeal because it had not been raised in the trial court). 
Here, Allisen attempts to perpetuate this merry-go-
round of litigation by raising a new cause of action for the 
first time on this appeal. Had Allisen wished to bring a common 
law dram shop action she should have done so at the outset rather 
than attempting to prolong the litigation at this stage. 
POINT II 
MARJORIE ALLISEN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO 
PROCEED ON A COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE THEORY 
BECAUSE UTAH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE COMMON LAW 
DRAM SHOP LIABILITY. 
Allisen1s attempt to raise a cause of action based upon 
a common law dram shop theory would require this Court to do here 
what it explicitly chose not to do in Yost v. State, 640 P2d 
1044. In that case this Court "refused to adopt by judicial fiat 
remedies commonly available under so-called 'civil damage1 or 
3 
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'dram-shop acts." Id. 1046. In the case of Beach v. University 
of Utah, 726 P2d 413 (Utah 1986) this Court reviewed the Yost 
decision in the margin at 417 and reiterated that "Utah 
recognizes no common law right of action against a provider of 
alcohol based upon the fact that the alcohol was furnished in 
violation of the law." 
This approach was followed by the Tenth Circuit in 1984 
in Tovar v. Lee, No. 84-1540 (10th Cir., Nov. 20, 1984) an 
apparent unpublished opinion, but, which was previously relied on 
by Clearfield City in its Motion for Summary Judgment, a copy of 
the Order and Judgment is attached hereto marked as Exhibit "A". 
That court upheld a decision of District Court Judge Bruce 
Jenkins based upon his reading of the Utah Dram Shop Act in 
effect at the time of the accident in this case. Judge Jenkins 
held, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, that Utah's Dram Shop Act was 
preemptive. When the Utah legislature created a cause of action 
against the providers of liquor for third parties injured by 
those to whom such liquor was provided it preempted all other 
causes of action based upon such a theory. 
What Allisen is attempting to do here is to expand the 
liability of a provider of alcohol beyond the boundaries 
explicitly laid out by the legislature. She does this first by 
arguing that what the legislature said was not what it meant. 
Failing that, she requests this Court to amend the law (as the 
legislature eventually did) effective at the time of the 
4 
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accident. Such action would constitute judicial fiat rejected in 
Yostr and should not now be adopted. 
POINT III 
IF ALLISEN IS ALLOWED TO PROCEED ON A COMMON 
LAW NEGLIGENCE THEORY, THEN THIRD-PARTY 
DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MUST 
BE DENIED. 
The logic of the Third-parties' Motion for Summary 
Judgment derives from Allisen1s Dram Shop Act claim. Their 
arguments that contribution is inappropriate for dram shop 
actions and that they cannot be "joint tort feasors" with a dram 
shop under a dram shop action are inapposite to a common law 
action. As a result, if this Court holds that Allisen may 
proceed against the American Legion Post No 134, then it must 
also allow the Legion to seek contribution from the third-party 
defendants for their negligence. Any other result would be 
grossly unfair to the Legion. 
CONCLUSION 
Allisen should not be allowed at this late date to add 
a new cause of action based upon common law dram shop liability. 
To do so would be unfair to the American Legion, disruptive of 
orderly procedures, and would require this Court to create by 
judicial fiat a cause of action the legislature had preempted. 
If Allisen is allowed to include this new cause of action then 
the American Legion Post Number 13 4 must also be allowed to seek 
ALLISEN v. AMERICAN LEGION 
POST NO. 134, et al. 
Reply Brief of Appellant 
Case No. 880031 
contribution from those who under common law principles could be 
considered joint tort feasors. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of July, 1988. 
BATtRY GOMBERG/fJ£15) of 
DAVID BERT HAVAS/AND ASSOCIATJ 
Attor neya/for Appella nt 
2604 Madjfsoja^Avenue 
Ogdenr Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 399-9636 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeab 
Tenth Circuit 
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT juny £ Q ^ § 4 
HOWARD K. PHILLIES 
Offfl 
No. 84-1540 
(D.C. Civil No. C-83-1077J) 
(D. Utah, Central Division) 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Before BARRETT, DOYLE, and HeWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, 
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 
three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 
would net be cf material assistance in the determination of this 
appeal. fieje. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 10(e). The 
cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 
The issue is whether, under Utah law, an intoxicated person 
has a cause of action against a dram shop owner for personal 
injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident caused by such 
person's voluntary consumption of intoxicating beverages in the 
dram shop. The district court held that under Utah law there was 
no such cause of action. We agree. 
t-i/r* a«"s^ ''^ a »!"*?* A - I 
From the complaint we learn that Richard Jesse Tovarf an 
adult, became intoxicated in a tavern owned by Merlin Evan Lee. 
In this regard, it is alleged that Lee, or his agents and 
employees, negligently permitted Tovar to become intoxicated and 
that thereafter, while still in an intoxicated condition, Tovar 
drove his motorcycle off the road and sustained serious personal 
injuries and is now, in fact, a quadriplegic, Tovar sought 
general damages from Lee, the dram shop owner, in the amount of 
$10,000,000, Federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of 
citizenship* 28 U.S.C. S 1332, 
In his answer, Lee first pled that the complaint failed to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Later, Lee 
moved for judgment on the pleadings* Leefs position is that under 
the Utah tram Shop Act only a third party who sustains injuries 
because of the acts of an intoxicated person has a cause of action 
against the dram shop owner who permitted his patron to become 
intoxiated, and that the Act does not create a cause of action 
against the dram shop owner on behalf of an intoxicated patron who 
himself sustains injury as a result of intoxication, Utah Code 
Ann* S 32xll~l, et seq. (Supp. 1983). At this juncture, Tovar 
sought to amend his complaint so as to include a separate claim 
against Lee based on a Utah statute relating to the maintenance of 
a common or public nuisance. 
The district court denied Tovarfs motion to file an amended 
complaint and granted Leefs motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
A judgment of dismissal followed* Tovar appeals. We affirm. 
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The Utah Dram Shop Act creates, in so many words, a cause of 
action in favor of a third party, who sustains injury at the hands 
of an intoxicated person, against the dram shop owner who 
permitted his patron to become intoxicated* Utah Code Ann. S 32-
11-1 (Supp. 1983). However, that statute does nat create any such 
cause of action in favor of the intoxicated person against the 
dram shop owner. 
Leefs position is that the Dram Shop Act is preemptive and 
that the anl£ cause of action created by that statute is one in 
favor of an injured third party against the dram shop owner. 
Tovar's position is that the statute is not preemptive and 
that Tovar, under Utah law, has a common law cause of action 
against Lee, the dram shop owner, or, in the alternative, that he 
has a cause of action under Utah statutory law pertaining to the 
maintenance of a public nuisance. As indicated, the district 
court sustained Leefs position and entered judgment in his favor. 
This is another diversity case which turns on a federal 
judgefs understanding of local state law. It would appear that 
the Utah Supreme Court has not yet addressed the precise issue 
here involved. In such circumstance, the view of a resident 
federal district judge on an unsettled question of local state law 
is entitled to some deference by a federal appellate court, and, 
on review, should not be overturned unless the appellate court has 
a rather firm view that the federal district judge erred. S&&. 
Colonial Park Country Club v. Joan of Arc, P.2d (10th 
Cir. 1984) (No. 83-1333); Budde v. Ling-Temco-Vought, 511 F.2d 
-3-
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1033 (10th Cir. 1975). We have no such feeling in the instant 
case. 
Our attention has not been directed to any Utah case which 
would support Tovarfs contention that he has a common law cause of 
action against Lee. The Utah Oram Shop Act creates a cause of 
action in favor of an injured third party against the dram shop 
owner, but creates no corresponding cause of action in favor of an 
intoxicated person who injures himself. We are disinclined to 
disturb the district court's belief that the Otah Dram Shop Act is 
preemptive. In this regard, in Miller v. City of Portland, 288 
Or. 271, 604 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Or. 1980), the Oregon Supreme Court 
(Or. 1980), considering a dram shop act similar to the Utah 
statute, spoke as follows: 
This court has never previously recognized a common law 
cause of action in favor of a person who suffers injury 
resulting from his or her own consumption of alcohol. 
Nor have most other courts. Because it would be 
contrary to apparent legislative policy, we also 
consider it inappropriate to create a common law cause 
of action for physical injury to minors caused by their 
illegal purchase of alcoholic liquor. 
For a general discussion of the policy considerations 
militating against creating a cause of action against a tavern 
owner in favor of one who voluntarily gets intoxicated, 3£& Kindt 
v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976). In 
that case, the court stated: 
A rule of liability here could have no other possible 
effect upon patrons than to encourage them to excessive 
liquor consumption at taverns. Forthwith upon the 
announcement of a rule of law which permits a drunken 
patron to recover damages for his own injuries from the 
tavern keeper, patrons who have heretofore felt concern 
for their own safety should they become overly 
intoxicated will relax their personal efforts, for three 
readily apparent reasons. First, because they will 
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assume that the bartenders will exercise greater care on 
their behalf; second, because they very naturally will 
feel that if they are hurt they will be compensated for 
such hurt; and third, because we • . . will in effect 
have encouraged their over indulgence, by pampering 
their delinquency. It cannot be otherwise. .The already 
tragic statistics which so horribly 'describe the 
slaughter of innocent persons by drunk drivers will 
immediately increase, to societyfs further disadvantage. 
IdL at 611-12. 
As stated above, the district court refused to allow Tovar to 
amend his complaint so as to include a separate claim based on the 
local statute pertaining to a public nuisance, and such is now 
assigned as error. Although leave to amend shall be freely 
granted when justice so requires, leave to amend need not be 
granted where the "futility of amendment* is apparent. Mountain 
View v. Abbott Laboratories, 630 F.2d 1383, 1389 (10th Cir. 1980). 
Believing, as we do, that the Utah Dram Shop Act is preemptive, 
there can be no cause of action in favor of Tovar based on any 
public nuisance theory. 
Judgment affirmed. 
.HOWARD K. PHILLIPS, Clerk/ 
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